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By Steve R. Johnson, UNLV

Tht• doctrine of judicial estoppcl
is not on soml' law~·er.;' mdar scrcct\S.
Th:u's rei,'T•'trablc. Not anricipnting
i1ppli<'<l1ion of the nile, a person m:iy
nrnkc a claim rhar can hurt him or her
in I he lnni: run. Or, un:1w3re of rhc
mlc, a party may foll co il'>.~rt n
potentially ~ucn·Hfo: defense. Or,
lmving onh• n V•~ry general uwarencss
uf the mle, ;111 ;llrorncy may miss
suhtlcrlr.~ nr forum v;iriatinn~ thilt <1rc
I he <lill'crcncc lu,t ween winning :ind
losing.
This article has three pmts. Part I
Jc.scrill\.-,. tl1,~ doclri1w of judicial
csmp1>cl, c111pha,i2in11 iis purposes.
Pnrt II ci<plon:s two n:~ccnr jmlidnl
cstoppcl <lcdsion~of the lJni1c1I SWtt~•
Supreme Court: C/,wl<md v. l'olii;y
Mttllt\l?CT!tc!lll Symmu Cll'l'p.1 aml New
I [ampJJliri! v. Maine." Finally, Part Ill
surveys the great variation' thnL ha\'c
<!Xisrt:d In formulations of the
doctrine.

waiver, the ,1111 y of <'.onsistc1u:y {in
lax),7 aml - our subject. - jutlidal
estoppcl.

Broadly put, th,, .:kxtrinc of
ju<llcial estoppcl prevents " perst111
from aSli<:rtlnic dnlms, dd'c1i\cs, or
positions thnt m·e inconsisten t wit.h
claims, dcfcru:cs, ur position~, which
that person ns!erted In a prior
proccedini:. The doctrine can be uscJ
e1cher offensively or defernivcl\'.
It Is widely n11reed thnt the
doctrine wns first npplled in 1857 by
the Sunrcmc Courr of Tcnn~-sscc in
M11milr~11 v. Zlmmennan.~ In thot cnsc,
Hamilton asserted that he was
Zimmf'mmn's parmcr In a store while
Zimm(!rm:m claimed rhnt Hamilton
was only a clt.tk in the titOrl'.
i'lcatli1111s wer"' intnxluct'<I ln1m :m
earlier cnnrt <~IMC in which Hamllron
slntetl 1hnt allcb'ltlirni> <lt·st:rihing him
as a clerk in I he store were ·~11l11<t>in•
rhtlly true: ·n 1c li:nnc.'i.'i(!c Supreme
Cuurt held rlmt such stnt<mwm> in rht!
earlier c:uc csluppcd Hamilton from
ui.ainlalnlng i111he scctlml l:<L\C 1.hat he

THE NATURE AND ORIGIN
OF THE DOCTRINE
l.11w nnJ equity h;ive developc<l wa~ a panncr.
numerous doctrines of preclu~ion.
111c rnlionalcs 11dvm1ccJ for lhc
Some are familiar and frequently various doctrines of preclusion advert
im•okc<l, such a.s equit;iblc cstoppel,l sometimes lo prot~tlon of tl11: ju<llcit1I
collateral estoppcl, res judicata, and process anJ other times to ad1icvi11g
the concept of judicial ;idmlssions foirnes.s hetween the parties. TI1c first
(under which a stotcmcnt by a party m of these traditlonully has prepondcr·
counsel is treated as conclusively nte<l in justlficntion of judicinl
esrnbllshing :1 matter, obvinting the cmoppcl. The Hamilton v. Zimmennan
need for proot) .• Others .u e somewhat court prcmisc<I the rule of preclusion
k'il.' wdl known, for t'Xample tlw on tlw nc•-<l to prolect the S."\llCtity of
1kictrine vf electiun,1 various rules of the oath administered to witnesses and

-------·------- -. -·...- - -··-----------

10 'lafoi:uanl the judicial sy•l<'lll from ;1buse nn,I ln$.S u( publk

cstcem.• Later Jl'l:l~lons havr. srnkt'n of prescn•mlon of Judidal
int••gritr uncl n\'oiJh1i\ ' 111i;;c,·111lim·•<'w of rejcclin~ ;m ''affront
co judicial dil,!nity,•11 a11J uf nvoiding repetitious litigation and
p1·otl'Ctin11 · juMiflablc relimu:c 1111 n11posing parrit:s' positions In
licii,>:ition."11

A. Clevelllntl v. l'olky Ma11ai:~mcn1 S~src1m C"'/"
C:lr.,,.,,/mul invol\'ed :i frelluent judicial csloppcl h.111kgro1111d.
Aitcr sufforing a mokl' <md loslni.; her job. Cmolyn Clevcl:~ml
:owlil'd for anti obtained Sncinl Security Disi1liili1y l11•11r:m<'('
critiched as well, for (SSDI) hrncfir~. clniming that she couldn't. work bct:a11se of lu:r
disability. A w•~k before her ~SDI
awurd, Clcvcl1111d fifo<l ~uh against
her fomtcr employer, .:0111cmli11t.i
"fh1>;1dh pt11, 1lw
rh:ir hl·r flrini: was l-.e.:ause of J,.:r
disahilu.y in \'iolutillll o( 1ltc
1 1 >t t r i I l l · 1
111
1; i
Amcrkans with Disabiliric; At:r
(ADA).
l'-..lt>J'jWI j'W\Ttll" :1
Th<' district court gmntd

I lowe\'cr, the J uctrinc 11:1~ bt·t~n
imtance on gro1mJs 1lmt it can
pt•l<luc c hari;h nnd unjust outcom•'ll
arnl rhar it 1•iolares the 11early
1111ivt•rs:illy accepicJ pmccicc of
a llowing
lnctinsistcnt
and
al1crm1t ivc pleadin11s.u
Thu~.
som<" jurisdictions hnve not
rcc.ogni?t'd the doctrine uc all <•r
h:wl.' impo~ed clements limiting
rnmmarv jud.:mem ro Cleveland'~
l ' l'l""t>I) ll'()lll :l.'c'-i\Tlillg
the dncrrinc's punch.•·•
l'X«'mploycr. It rensonc..I dull
Most directly relc1•ant to
Clt'\'t•l:tnd's claim that she wos
t L1i111.-.., dt·k11"t''-i, l )r
rorally disabk,1 for SSDI purposes
N•'.\'a:la arrornry~. both the Ninth
Circuit I! and the Nevacfa Supreme
was inconsistent with her pro1•ing a
j'<l'-illillll'- 1'1;11 ;1rc·
m:ct:ss:try c lem~nr of her ADA
Court 1' :icn~rr thl' doctrine of
' d11i111: 1har ~Ill' could "pcrf1m11 the
jmlidal <"s1011pel. l lowe\'cr, It is
llll\111'-ii .'> ll'ill \\ill1 (·l; 1i111:--,
foir 1.0 :;;1y rhnr n cuhcr court has yet
; c.,scnrinl fimc1 ions" t,f her job (nt
"carve.I in -rone'' t.hc precise
' lt!>tst wit h rcnsonnble accommodu·
1 it·lt·11...,1·"· 1 >1· I\( 1-.;i Ill ll l.'>,
1.1011).1: The fifrh Circuit affirmed,
con1ours of rhc doctrine os they
will apply ii, II
holding that •thl' ;ipplication for or
\\'l1icl11h:11 jll'l~1l11
1he rcct:ipt ol soda! security
J11dk1>1l r.stoppcl hns been
11i:1ahili1y hl'lldlts creatl'S a rcburrnl
riwlied ucro'l>! :i wide spectrum of
. 1....: ....,,·111:,l in :1 1);·1111·
presumption I hat tht' da1m:mt or
cases an<I ccmrrovf'rsics, both
federal and :<hllt•. It has .tp('Cllred in
11n1cn·,li11~ 1 .
ll11l
l1i11t· , reciplenl of such b~net\ts is
propen y, ton, concracr, .md
~ judicially cstuppcl from ~•SSi'rring
i that he b a 'qualifk-.1irnlividual with
commcrdttl and liui;inc:ss law c:iscs,
1 :Ill J,l. 11>1..·tl ,·j1Jh'I
: n disablli ty."l.I
nmoug 01lwrs. Alrhough much ·
.
A 1111ani111011• Snjlr<"m•~ Court
num: frcqut:tll in ci\'il coscs,•e
liikthi\,·\\ l>I
t reversed the dcdNion. Closely
judicial csrop11d hns b~.tn invoked
In crlmitu1I C:l'C' 100.:9 An are(\ in
! reading the statutes, the Court found
I i l ', l \' \'
f rhor clnims for SSDI lrcncllr8 :mcl
which the tlitt:t.rim~ is being applkd
i ADA damngcs "do not it1hcrc11tly
with incrcasini; regularity i~
:· conflict to the 1101111 where wurts
bnnkruptcy crrn<W\'t!rs.
For
example, dchLors whn-.c >c:h~lul~ omit pending or pOLenriul ;f~oul;I ttppfy ;, spt.~i~I 1i'~advc presumpti\ln like the one awlicd
causes of action often find rhar thf' ornltte<l .;1;uscs of actl01\ fater hy 1.lm Court of Appcals."14 AccordinRly, the Court 1•ac:ncd the
arc dismls.~e1l hy 1he: non·b.,nkmprcy fomm courts on Judicial Mttnmary judgment nnd rl•ttmnded the case.
While rcjl".ctini: th~ presumption, the Court did hold 1ha1
estoppel grounds.lo
i11consis1.c11cy is lcg:11ly signific:int. In effcc:t, but not in n.'lmc, Lhc
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Court '~mlorscd a version of judicial l.~coppel. It held: "When
01·er a humlrcJ yt'ars ago (but still lll.'llrly 40 ycurs nfLer fawJ wilh a plaintiffs ~wom statement ;werting 'tornl disability'
Hamilton I'. 2in11t1<.'!11um), rhc Unlrctl States Supreme Courr in or the like, th., wurt •hould require nn cxpl:m;1tion of any
Davis v. Wttkclee mlvanccil a .•omewhat different formulation of apparent inconsistcm:~· wirh rh~ neccssiry demcms o( an ADA
ji.dicial ~toppcl 1111111 1lm1 given by chc Tennessee: Supreme claim."11 l11 uLl1cr wunls, "an i\01\ plaintiff c1mnot simph• i1more
Court. The Da..,i.1 Cour1· ~latt,d: "111ht•rc t\ party assumes a certain the apparent contr-.idkrion rh~r arises out of the earlier SSDI
position in a lclf.il pron:cdini:. and succetds in maintninlni: that toml dls.1bilily dai111. R;uht·r. she must proffer a sufficient
pn~ition, he may 1101 thereafter,: imply because his Interests hnve cxplnnntion. "l6
dia~eJ, assume a conunry 1Kt,ition.• u
However, further explonu :011 nf jutlicial l'Sloppcl by the High B. New I lmnpshirc v. Maine
Post-Clcvckutd decisions have :«~11 ( :l..'Wkmd :1~ t'stablishing
Court wns deluyed for i:cncratk,,lli after /)twi.1. The drought ended
in 1999 and 2001 when the Co11r1 h>tn,l,•il tl11w11. re'lpt.·ctl\'ely, the
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The Doctrine of Judlolal Es:t_gprut.l
" new methodology for ju<licial estuppcl in
1he SSDl·ADA and relnted comex1s, bu1
noc as displacin11 more traditional judicial
em1ppel analysis in other nrc1L~.n Thm
rl'adin:,: seems ren~onnblc in light of the
Supreme Court's ZOOI decision in New
Hm11/1sl1ire .,, M11ine.
'111·11 osc involved a border dispute
lwtwcen rwo Harts. In a 197 ,' dispute
l'l:hv.:.·n 1h<' tw•• ~l<ll\.'s over lobster fishinl{
ri1,1hts, the twn <tatl'S de~·clopd 11 consent
dL"<ree as to their fateral marine buumLirv.
The Supreme Court accepted that
:ogt<'t'lllcnt ;md entered judgmtnt based on
ir. Thl·n, in 2000, one c1fthc smr..-s (New
H;i1111~,l1in·. ) hrought an uriginnl nction
aw~in~r rhc othl.'r as tu rheir inland river
houmlary. Nt'.w Hampshire's position in
1hc 2000 cnsc \\ii.; incnnsim,nr with th<'
pnsitl1111 ii ac1:cp1cd in thl~ 1977 r.onscnt
decree. On 1ha1 ha~i~. the otlwr ~rate
(Main,:) m,'.<I :I lllOI iun Ill dismhs.
A 1111m1i111rn~~ Supreme Courr grantr.d
Mninc's 11101 inn on 1ltl: i:rnund nf judicinl
estoppcl. In rnntra~r to rhr spe<'ial
cswppcl rule i1 cmfic,I in Clet-t/111111, rhr
Court in New Hmnpshirc fnmwd 1111: mlc
ii\ tmditlomil tcnns. It idcntifiL'll I hn:c
lncton: (I) whether the 1•ar1y's l:ill:r
posi tion wn.~ "dcMly i1u.:unsi.•1c111• with its
prior position, (2) wlu:thl:r the parry
~11.;cc~'\lcd in pcrs11mli11i: a coun 111 accq.>t
tlS L'llf!il!f jlOSillun, and (:}) Whl:tlwr the
purty would derive 1111 unfair 111lva11111ge
from the im:nmistcm:y i( not cstopp~.J.18
The Court made three n1:1cr
signlflcmll points. Fim, juclidal cswppd is
an equitable approach which n cnurt
lnvllkes nt its discrction.Z9 Second, in

c1111111cml.ing 1he alx1H: ilm:c f:1.:tors, "wt'
llo not. csluhlish inflexihle prcrcq11i~lt1•s or
an cxhaustiw f,1r11111la (or ,le1er111i11i11g 1h.awlkahili1y of judicial ('.S!Opp\'I .
Additional co11sidl:ra1iu11s mav inli>nn 1h1'
Joctrine's applirntillll in src~il'k li11:111al
conr.exts.''~) l11ird, Judldal 1:s1oppd is!""'
likely tll be applied uguh1sl a 11uvcm111c111al
party than a prin1tc litignnl', espcdnlly
when "1:stuppcl would comprnmlse ;1
i.:ovcmniental interest in .mfordng ti ..,
lnw."tt

VARIATIONS IN

APPLYING

THE DOCTRINE
The hullmurk nf judi.::ial C$luppcl is
lluiclity. Oiffcrenr couns disal(rcc 011 its
clements; the same court oiten invokes
differing fommli1tions in different cuscs.
t\ml, in mony jurisdictions, llUiduncc a.s to
key paramccers is scant. Commenmtor)
nfren h:wc rcmarke,( on this v·lth cx;t,pcr·
ation," but fluidity is pcrhap.s inc1•itable
given the doctrine's underlying «:11ulmblc
purposea.
One major division is wheth~r the
<loci rlne cnn bl' 11pplied when the first
d:tim was unsuccessful, 11 but m:iny other
point~ of unrcrrnlnty or ,iis:igr... cmcnt l'Xist
;u; well. They indu<lc:
(I) whether the two claims must hal'C

hccn mad<' In rht~ snmt. f>r<'l<'...eding (or
1t~1st in rdatcd proceedin.;s ),

;it

( 2) whet her Ihe cl;iims mnst have be...n
m;iJc !:dim'. the satm! 1rihunal,
(.3) whether c!Hims hdi1n! mlm inisrmrive
11::m1cies (as well ;ts co111u)

triufll!r thi: tlu.:uinc,
( 4) whe1her the parties in ihe
two proceedings must. he the

same (01 at le11st in prh·i1y),

«onclushlll~ n~

well, :md

( 7) which fnrmulnrion, umoni.: the
•·ontlicting vcr,;ion~ held by J ifforcnt
rn11r1~. should lie applied in diversity or
dmke·of.l:.1w •itu:uions.
Tht' N<'vmfo rnum h:1ve spokt'n to
only >r>nw of thcsl' 1narrt•rs.J• Moreovi:r, it
wrntltl Ill.' wrong to think th•U unanimity,
01· ,:,·en strong co11.«.·n~m, prev:i ils in
Ncv.i,fa ns h> im[1<1ttant p:.1rarncters. A
rcctnt Nt:v:ida S11prcm1~ Coun: l'.;1$t shows
al1i~.JI Ay 4 tn '\ , rhr Court hdcl that :\
former ~JM»1st: was judicially 1ml)pped from
atla1:kin1: a divutl'.c <ll,cn·l' (on rhe ground
that the triul mun had lacked jurliidic·
1i,m) i11 liul11 of1he fo(I slu: h;u l pr.,vi•"1sly
agrccJ 1.hn1 ccr111i11 "facts" Wt!rt~ rn1c,
which (had 1hcy lll·c11 l ruc) would have
l!(iven that co:.trt jurlsc.liction.~ One Ju~tkc
Ji.sagrced, appearing 10 say ilm1 judlci:tl
estoppcl can involve only s11h.i1111l i\'I'
i5Sucs within an othcrwi$\: •1111pcr case, nnl
iurlsdiclional usucs.l1 'livo n1hcr J 11~tll:1~'
disscnw<l based on their pcrccpti.111 of Ihe
(.•qultics, t!mphnshlni: "lm1dvcne11cc or
mistake" as opposed to knowing misrcprc·
sencation.'-<
l.n shore, judicial esmppel is
rccognhed in Nevn<la nnd p..ltenth1lly
applies across many cnteSloric.• of cases.
I luwever, there rcnwins coruiJcrnble
scopl.' for crenri\•e ndvocacr in shaping the
contours of the doctrine and its
npplicntlon IC- particulnr controvt>rsics. N.

The 111ir/1or Is !ht E.L.. \Viegand Profmor Ill
iht: \'t'iUiam S. l:luy(l School of Lmv,
l!niwr.~icy of Ne•.Nult1, l.11s VeJrllS. A 1981
g1wlu1ur of New Yc1rk l/mwrsiJ.J School of'
I .llw, he "'"'~ in />rivaie procci(e a.t 11 .".w.nior
Aummy tllidr rk 11{.'I C.:liirf Cmtn.~el's
Office, and <ts a S/1ec:iul As.~isuutt IJ11i1ed
St.ue~ 1\1111n~y. The authm i1wilt'.~
comments and q1u:s1io11s 111
scc1~.joh1uon@ccnull.net~.eJu

(3) whether the lm.:1111si~Lcncy
must result from an intentional
effort I\) mislend (as opposed lO
lnndvectencc or misrnkc).
(6) whether the Joctrinc
opcroces onh· as to llssercions of
fact or extencls to legit!
I0
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Moberly, Playing "flu11 t1111I /.J.iose" 1w Jim
Fast!: A Look at Judir.iul F..1wf!pel in 1/ie
Ninth Circuit, 3J Gum. L. lk\'. 171 ( I997·
1998). llciwcvcr, these ~rtidcs prt>ccdcd
rhe United Stutes Supreme Court's
Clct>cland and Netv Hwnjnltire d..,dsions
diS<.:ussed in Part II.
18. See, e.g., John S. Niduil•, Sa/eg1111rtlit1g
r/w Tnirh in Court: T~ Doctrine of Jwlici11l

E5roppd, S. Cnl. Lawyer, J;m./Feh. 2CCl2, at
32 (summnriring cases in 1.hcsc nrcas).
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